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 SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO HOLDS THAT AN EXCESS INSURER WHO 
ENDORSES A PRIMARY INSURER’S COVERAGE AGREEMENT BY FOLLOW-FORM IS 
SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRAL CLAUSE WITHIN THAT AGREEMENT   
By 
Jamie L. Augustinsky* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Radil v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of 
Colorado held that an excess insurer was bound by the arbitration clause in the 
primary insurer’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the excess 
insurer endorsed the primary insurer’s coverage by follow-form.1 The court 
reasoned that since the excess insurer did not provide any limiting language 
concerning the scope of the coverage, the follow-form endorsement applied to the 
entire scope of the primary insurer’s coverage, including the arbitral clause.2 
Further, the court rejected the excess insurer’s argument that a boilerplate 
statement found at the end of the policy agreement constituted an express 
disclaimer of the arbitration clause.3 The court cited Colorado’s strong public 
policy in favor of arbitration as a mechanism of alternate dispute resolution to 
support its holding.4 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
  
Jennifer Radil, Plaintiff, worked as a camp counselor for Sanborn Western 
Camps (“the employer”).5 On July 10, 2000, the employer scheduled a counselor 
appreciation day, which included a whitewater raft trip partially paid for by the 
                                                 
* Jamie L. Augustinsky is a 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at the Pennsylvania State 
University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Radil v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 688, 689 (Colo. 2010). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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employer.6 Because the employer’s vans were not available on that day, a 
supervisor provided her sport utility vehicle to transport the counselors.7 The 
supervisor’s daughter drove the vehicle.8 Because there were more passengers than 
seats in the vehicle, Radil rode in the space behind the seats, which did not have 
any passenger restraints.9 En route, the driver lost control of the vehicle and the 
vehicle rolled, ejecting Radil and breaking her neck.10 Radil was seriously injured 
and rendered a quadriplegic as a result of the accident.11 
The driver of the vehicle was insured under her mother’s automobile 
liability policy with a $500,000 limit.12 The employer’s primary automobile 
insurance policy was with Great American Assurance Company (“Great 
American”) and had a $1 million limit.13 The employer also held a commercial 
umbrella policy issued by National Union Fire Insurance Company (“National 
Union”), Defendant, with a $25 million limit.14 The Great American policy 
provided uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage and contained 
numerous terms and conditions defining the policy’s coverage.15 The Great 
American policy included an arbitration clause, which provided that: 
  
If we, and an “insured” disagree whether the “insured” is 
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or driver 
of an “uninsured motor vehicle” or do not agree as to the 
amount of damages that are recoverable by that “insured,” 
then the matter may be arbitrated. However, disputes 
                                                 
6 Radil, 233 P.3d at 690. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Radil, 233 P.3d at 690. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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concerning coverage under this endorsement may not be 
arbitrated. Either party may make a written demand for 
arbitration.16 
 
National Union’s umbrella policy contained a “follow-form endorsement” of Great 
American’s UM/UIM coverage.17 This endorsement stated that: 
 
This insurance shall not apply to: Any obligation of the 
Insured under an “Uninsured Motorist” law. However, if a 
policy listed in the Schedule of Underlying Insurance 
provides this coverage: 
 
1. this exclusion will not apply; and 
2. the insurance provided by our policy will not be broader 
than the insurance coverage listed in the Schedule of 
Underlying Insurance. 
 
All other terms and conditions of this policy remain unchanged.18 
 
 After being denied worker’s compensation benefits, Radil filed a personal 
injury claim against the employer and the driver of the vehicle as a diversity action 
in federal court.19 Meanwhile, Great American filed a declaratory judgment action 
against the employer and Radil in state court to establish that it had no duty to 
defend or indemnify the employer.20 The employer joined National Union as a 
cross-claim defendant to Great American’s action.21 Radil subsequently filed a 
cross-claim declaration against National Union, which stated that she was entitled 
                                                 
16 Radil, 233 P.3d at 690. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Radil, 233 P.3d at 690. 
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to underinsured motorist benefits under the National Union policy.22 With National 
Union’s consent, Radil settled her claims against the driver for $500,000 and 
settled with the employer for the $1 million Great American policy limit in federal 
court.23 Radil did, however, reserve her right to seek underinsured motorist 
benefits from National Union.24 The employer and Great American then stipulated 
to a dismissal of their claims in the state court action, leaving only Radil and 
National Union as parties in this state court proceeding.25  
 Radil moved to either compel arbitration of her claims against National 
Union, or to amend her cross-claim to include claims for underinsured motorist 
benefits.26 National Union moved for summary judgment, claiming that it had no 
obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits to Radil.27 The trial court grant 
National Union’s motion and denied Radil’s requests to either compel arbitration 
or amend her cross-claim.28 On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the grant of 
summary judgment to National Union and concluded that Radil was entitled to 
underinsured motorist benefits under the National Union policy.29 On remand, 
Radil again moved to either compel arbitration of her claims or amend her cross-
claim.30 National Union argued that its follow-form endorsement did not 
incorporate Great American’s arbitration clause.31 The trial court subsequently 
found that a valid arbitration agreement did exist between Radil and National 
Union and granted Radil’s motion to compel arbitration.32 In response to National 
Union’s litigation-based waiver defense, the trial court determined that the arbitral 
                                                 
22 Id. at 690-91. 
23 Id. at 691. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Radil, 233 P.3d at 691. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (citing Radil v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co, 207 P.3d 849, 859 (Colo. App. 2008), cert. 
denied). 
30 Id. 
31 Radil, 233 P.3d at 691. 
32 Id. 
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panel, and not the court, was responsible for determining the validity of this 
defense.33 National Union then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado to issue 
a rule to show cause why the trial court should not vacate its order.34 
 
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 
A. National Union’s Follow-Form Endorsement Bound It to the Arbitral 
Clause  
 
The Supreme Court of Colorado first discussed the appropriate standard to 
employ when reviewing a trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The court 
stated that although a trial court’s order compelling arbitration is not immediately 
appealable, the state Supreme Court could exercise its original jurisdiction to 
review the order.35 The court further articulated that the existence and scope of an 
arbitration agreement are questions of law that courts review de novo by applying 
state contract law principles, resolving all ambiguities in favor of arbitration.36 
 The court then turned its discussion to the issue of whether National 
Union’s follow-form endorsement incorporated the arbitration clause of Great 
American’s UM/UIM endorsement. The court explained that Great American, as 
the primary policy, included specific terms and conditions within its endorsement 
that specifically described the scope of its coverage.37 Further, these terms and 
conditions constituted the “form” of Great American’s coverage and were evidence 
of the parties’ intention on the scope of the coverage.38  This coverage included an 
arbitration clause that gave either party to the agreement the right to compel 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 691-92. 
36 Radil, 233 P.3d at 692. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
YEARBOOK ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
 
 
298 
arbitration of disagreements concerning the entitlement to or amount of the 
UM/UIM benefits.39  
 The court asserted that National Union’s follow-form endorsement of 
Great American’s UM/UIM coverage did not provide any language describing the 
specific coverage it endorsed.40 Because there was no express language limiting 
National Union’s UM/UIM coverage, the follow-form endorsement incorporated 
the entire form of Great American’s UM/UIM coverage.41 To hold otherwise in the 
absence of any express limiting language would have left the parties guessing as to 
what the coverage did and did not provide.42 Because the follow-form endorsement 
required National Union to assume “any obligation of the Insured under an 
‘Uninsured Motorist’ or ‘Underinsured Motorist’ law [where] a policy listed in the 
Schedule of Underlying Insurance provides this coverage,” the court concluded 
that the substance of National Union’s obligation was defined by the terms and 
conditions found within Great American’s UM/UIM coverage.43 Further, the court 
asserted that National Union could have explicitly rejected or modified the 
arbitration clause upon issuance of the follow-form endorsement.44 Because it did 
not, however, it could not attempt to avoid a particular term of the underlying 
coverage when its endorsement followed the form of that coverage.45  
 The court next addressed and rejected National Union’s argument that the 
statement “all other terms and conditions of this policy remain unchanged” 
expressly disclaimed the arbitration clause.46 The court found that this statement 
was a boilerplate statement that appeared at the end of each National Union 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Radil, 233 P.3d at 692. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 690. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Radil, 233 P.3d at 690. 
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endorsement, regardless of the specific content of each endorsement.47 Because 
this statement was ambiguous, the court reasoned that it must construe the 
statement in favor of arbitration.48 Accordingly, this ambiguous, boilerplate 
statement found at the end of National Union’s endorsement did not expressly 
disclaim the arbitration clause found within Great American’s UM/UIM coverage.  
 Because National Union endorsed the entirety of Great American’s 
coverage form and did not expressly disclaim the reference to arbitration found 
within that coverage, the court concluded that National Union was subject to 
arbitration pursuant to the coverage form. 
 
B. The Trial Court Must Determine the Defense of Litigation-Based Waiver 
 
 National Union next argued that, even if it was bound by the arbitration 
agreement, the trial court erred in its determination that the defense of litigation-
based waiver should be decided by the arbitral panel.49 The court stated the general 
rule that absent clear party intent to the contrary, trial courts and not arbitrators 
determine the scope of an arbitration agreement.50 When a court determines the 
scope of an arbitration agreement, it applies a presumption favoring arbitration 
unless it finds “positive assurance that the arbitration provision is not susceptible 
of any interpretation that encompasses the subject matter of the dispute.”51 Because 
the court determined that the plain language of the arbitration clause in Great 
American’s UM/UIM endorsement was expressly of limited scope, it decided that 
the defense of litigation-based waiver was outside the scope of the arbitral 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 693-94 n.3 (citing Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217-19 (3d. 
Cir. 2007) (explaining that a litigation-based waiver defense arises when one party argues 
that the opposing party has waived its right to arbitrate by actively litigating the case in 
court)). 
50 Id. at 693. 
51 Radil, 233 P.3d at 693. 
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agreement.52 The arbitration agreement expressly stated that it only applied to 
“disputes over entitlement to or recoverable amount of UM/UIM damages.”53 A 
litigation-based waiver defense, however, is a procedural defense that is unrelated 
to the issue of entitlement to or amount of damages.54 Accordingly, the court 
concluded that it found “positive assurance that the arbitration provision is not 
susceptible of any interpretation that encompasses a defense of litigation-based 
waiver,” and that the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to determine this 
defense.55 
 In arriving at this determination, the court explained the policy rationale 
behind the presumption that trial courts, and not arbitrators, decide the claims of 
litigation-based waiver.56 Trial courts are better-suited to decide these claims than 
arbitrators because litigation-based waiver defenses depend upon parties’ conduct 
before the trial court and “implicates trial court procedures with which arbitrators 
may have less familiarity.”57 Accordingly, the trial courts are in a better position to 
decide whether a request for arbitration after litigation is just an attempt at forum 
shopping.58 Further, it is inefficient to send a waiver claim to an arbitrator because 
if the arbitral panel decides that a party waived its right to arbitrate, it will send the 
proceedings back to the trial court “without having made any progress with respect 
to the merits of the dispute.”59 Finally, litigation-based waiver is a procedural 
question that is wholly unrelated to the merits of the dispute, which the parties 
intended to be decided by an arbitrator.60 If parties intend for a litigation-based 
waiver claim to be decided by the arbitrator, they could expressly provide for this 
                                                 
52 Id. at 694. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Radil, 233 P.3d at 694. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 695. 
60 Id. 
COMMENTS ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
 
301 
in the contract.61 Absent express language to the contrary, however, the court 
followed the presumption that the trial court and not the arbitrator must determine 
the validity of the defense.62 
The court further acknowledged that its holding on this matter was 
consistent with other jurisdictions which have held that litigation-based waiver 
defenses are properly determined by trial courts.63 Additionally, its decision still 
followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States in Howsam 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.64 Federal and state courts both before and after 
Howsam have found that litigation-based waiver defenses were properly 
determined by trial courts.65 
 
IV.  SIGNIFICANCE 
 
 This case is significant because it reaffirms the strong public policy in 
favor of arbitration.66 The court specifically stated that its holding “is supported by 
Colorado’s public policy favoring arbitration as a mechanism of alternative dispute 
resolution.”67 National Union attempted to argue that a boilerplate statement found 
at the end of its endorsement constituted a waiver of the arbitration clause in Great 
American’s policy.68 The court, however, found this statement to be ambiguous 
and articulated the rule that ambiguous statements should be construed in favor of 
                                                 
61 Radil, 233 P.3d at 695. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 694. 
64 Id. at n.3 (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (holding 
that there is a presumption that procedural defenses compelled to arbitration are properly 
determined by the arbitrator)). 
65 Id. (citing Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217-19 (3d. Cir. 2007) 
(reasoning that the Howsam holding only referred to “waiver, delay, or like defenses 
arising from non-compliance with contractual conditions precedent to arbitration” and did 
not upset the “traditional rule that courts, not arbitrators” should decide the validity of 
litigation-based waiver defenses)). 
66 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984). 
67 Radil, 233 P.3d at 692. 
68 Id. at 693. 
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arbitration.69 With this reasoning, the court attempted to indicate its preference for 
the resolution of disputes in arbitral proceedings rather than in the courts. 
Arbitration is a quicker way to achieve a final, binding solution to disputes than are 
court proceedings. Further, while decisions of a trial court can be, and oftentimes 
are, overturned by a higher court, decisions of an arbitral panel are given much 
more finality and will only be overturned by the courts in rare cases under the 
statutory or common law grounds for vacatur.70 Accordingly, courts prefer 
arbitration to free the court system of the time-consuming trials and inevitable 
appeals that arise when parties attempt to resolve their disputes in court. The 
Supreme Court of Colorado deemed arbitration to be a sufficient method for 
dispute resolution, and articulated that the strong state policy in favor of arbitration 
should prevent courts from removing a case from arbitration just because one party 
argued that an ambiguous statement constituted a waiver of the arbitral clause. 
The decision also informs parties that if they want to avoid an arbitration 
agreement, they must explicitly provide for the exclusion of arbitration within the 
contractual agreement.71 The United States Supreme Court has held that arbitration 
is a matter of contract, not coercion.72 Accordingly, courts cannot force parties to 
arbitrate when the parties’ agreement does not contain an arbitral clause.73 Parties 
are free to make valid agreements through contract and can choose whether or not 
to include the recourse to arbitration as a method for dispute resolution in those 
agreements. If, however, one party endorses an agreement which contains an 
arbitral clause, that party will be bound by that arbitral clause unless it explicitly 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Under FAA §10, vacatur will only be ordered if the arbitrators are corrupt, exceed their 
powers, or ignore the parties’ fundamental rights or the material terms of the arbitration 
agreement. The three common law grounds that supplement these statutory grounds for 
vacatur of an arbitral award are an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law, an arbitrary 
and capricious arbitral award, or an arbitral award that violates public policy. See THOMAS 
E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 230 (Thomson/West 2007). 
71 See Radil, 233 P.3d at 692. 
72 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
73 See Radil, 233 P.3d at 692. 
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rejects it. When endorsing Great American’s policy, National Union could have 
specifically contracted around the arbitral clause by providing a waiver of the right 
to arbitration. Because National Union did not explicitly waive the arbitral clause, 
but endorsed the arbitral clause as it stood in Great American’s policy, it was 
bound by the terms and conditions within that clause. Through this ruling, the 
court affirmed the presumption in favor of arbitration and informed future follow-
form endorsers to be aware of the terms and conditions of the policy they are 
endorsing. If they endorse a policy that contains an arbitral clause, they will be 
bound by that clause and compelled to arbitrate their disputes unless they take the 
affirmative steps to explicitly contract around the arbitral clause. 
